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The main goal of this paper is to describe a new semantic 
for conditional independence in terms of no double 
counting of uncertain evidence. For ease of exposition, 
we use probability calculus to state all results. But the 
results generalize easily to any calculus that fits in the 
framework of valuation-based systems. Thus, the results 
described in this paper apply also, for example, to 
Dempster-Shafer’s (D-S) belief function theory, to 
Spohn’s epistemic beliefs theory, and to Zadeh’s 
possibility theory. The concept of independent (or 
distinct) evidence in D-S belief function theory is 
analogous to the concept of conditional independence for 
variables in probability theory. 
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1 Introduction 
Conditional independence for probability theory has been 
traditionally interpreted in terms of irrelevance [Dawid 
1979, Spohn 1980, Pearl and Paz 1987]. In Shenoy 
[1994], I have interpreted it in terms of factorization of 
the joint probability distribution. In this paper, I describe 
a new semantic for conditional independence in terms of 
no double counting of uncertain knowledge. 
There are several advantages of these new semantics. 
First, these semantics provide a new method for building 
models in domains, such as sensor fusion, where these 
semantics can be easily applied. 
Second, Dempster-Shafer’s (D-S) belief function theory 
[Dempster 1967, Shafer 1976] uses the concept of 
independent (or distinct) pieces of evidence to qualify 
when it is proper to combine the corresponding belief 
functions by Dempster’s rule of combination. The 
concept of independent evidence can be understood as no 
double counting of uncertain evidence. These semantics 
of no double counting are paramount in building D-S 
belief function models. Yet, these semantics are not well 
understood and remains a mystery for many. The results 
provided here explain these semantics. This should make 
D-S belief function theory more appealing to 
probabilists, and facilitate the integration of these two 
uncertainty calculi. Thus, e.g., methods for constructing 
Bayesian network models can be easily adapted to 
constructing belief function models, and vice-versa. 
An outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In 
Section 2, we describe the notation used and basic 
definitions. In Section 3, we define conditional 
independence and describe its semantics in terms of 
irrelevance. In Section 4, we describe factorization 
semantics of conditional independence. In Section 5, we 
give a definition of what it means for probability 
potentials to be independent using the semantics of no 
double counting of uncertain knowledge, and we provide 
five sufficient conditions for independence of potentials. 
In Section 6, we show that our definition of 
independence of potentials satisfies the graphoid 
properties. In Section 7, we describe two examples to 
illustrate our definition and results. Finally, in Section 8, 
we summarize and conclude. 
2 Notation 
Upper-case Roman alphabets such as X, Y, Z will be used 
to denote variables. The state space of X is denoted by 
X. We assume that all variables have finite state spaces. 
Sets of variables will be denoted by lower-case Roman 
alphabets such as f, g, h, etc. The state space for a set of 
variables is the Cartesian product of the state space of 
variables in the set, f = { X | X  f}. Lower-case 
Greek alphabets will be used to denote potentials. A 
potential  for f is a function : f  R
+, where R+ 
denotes the set of non-negative real numbers. Although 
the domain of  is f, to simplify terminology, we refer 
to f as the domain of . In a Bayes net, potentials are also 
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called conditional probability tables. If (x) > 0 for all 
x  f, then we say  is a positive potential. Potentials 
can be marginalized and combined. We can also remove 
a potential from another potential using division (taking 
care to avoid division by zeroes). The removal operation 
can be viewed as an inverse of combination. Formal 
definitions are as follows. 
Marginalization. Suppose  is a potential for f, and 
suppose X  f. The marginal of  for f \{X}, denoted by 
X or by f \{X}, is a potential for f \{X} defined as 
follows. 
X(y) = f \{X}(y) = { (y, x) | x  X}  
for all y  f \{X}. (2.1) 
Marginalization is an operation that reduces the domain 
of potentials by addition over the state space of variables 
being removed. When we want to emphasize the variable 
that is being removed, we use the notation X, and when 
we want to emphasize the variables that remain in the 
domain after marginalization, we use the notation f \{X}. 
We can successively remove several variables from the 
domain of a potential, and the result is independent of the 
sequence in which the variables are removed. Thus  
( X1) X2 = ( X2) X1 = {X1, X2}, or using the alternative 
notation, ( f \{X1}) f \{X1, X2} = ( f \{X2}) f \{X1, X2}  
= f \{X1, X2}. We can remove all variables from a 
potential, resulting in a potential with a single value, 
which we can regard as a potential for the empty set. To 
keep our notation consistent, we assume that the state 
space of the empty set has a single element, denoted say 
by ,  = { }. 
Combination. First we need some notation for 
projection of states. Suppose y is a state of variables in f, 
and suppose g  f. Then the projection of y to g, denoted 
by y g, is the state of g obtained from y by dropping 
states of f \ g. If g = f, then y g = y. If g = , then y g = 
. 
Suppose f and g are arbitrary subsets of variables, 
suppose  is a potential for f, and suppose  is a potential 
for g. Then the combination of  and , denoted by , 
is a potential for f g defined as follows. 
( )(y) = K 1 (y f) (y g)  if K > 0, 
 = 0  if K = 0, (2.2) 
for all y  f g, where K is a normalization constant 
defined as follows: K = { (y f) (y g) | y  f g}. If 
K > 0, we say  and  are “combinable,” and if K = 0, we 
say  and  are “not combinable.” In the latter case, the 
combination of  and  results in a potential that is 
identically zero, which is the potential for f g 
representing contradiction. 
The combination operation must be used with care. If  
represents our knowledge about f,  represents our 
knowledge about g, and  and  are independent, then 
 represents the joint knowledge about f g. In the 
succeeding sections, we explain exactly what we mean 
when we say “  and  are independent.” Notice that there 
is no restriction on the sets f and g. They may be the 
same set, they may be disjoint, they may have a non-
empty intersection, or they may be subsets of each other. 
Thus, combination is pointwise multiplication followed 
by normalization (when normalization is possible). 
Some properties of combination are as follows. 
Combination is commutative and associative:  = 
, and ( ) = ( ) . Also, marginalization 
and combination share one important property called 
transitivity of marginalization over combination. 
Suppose  is a potential for f, and  is a potential for g, 
and suppose X  f and X  g. Then 
( ) X = X . (2.3) 
Finally, a few words on normalization in the definition of 
combination. When we are combining and marginalizing 
a lot of potentials, we can skip normalization and do it 
once at the very end. It makes no difference in the final 
results, but it is computationally efficient to avoid 
normalization every time we combine potentials. But, 
normalization is an important facet of combination in 
probability. The normalization constant K in (2.2) is a 
measure of conflict between  and . If K = 0, the 
knowledge in  and  totally conflict with each other, and 
we should doubt the veracity of either  or . 
Normal Potentials. Suppose  is a potential for f. We 
say  is a normal potential if ( )( ) = 1, i.e., the sum 
of all values of the potential add to 1. Notice that if  is 
obtained by combining two or more combinable 
potentials, then  is normal (by definition of 
combination). Also, if  is a normal potential, then all 
marginals of  are also normal. 
Vacuous Potentials. Let u denote the set of all variables. 
We assume that u is finite. Consider f, the set of all 
potentials with domain f, f  u. Then f together with the 
combination operator  forms a commutative semi-
group. Let u denote the set of all potentials (with 
domains that are subsets of u). Then ( u, ) also forms a 
semi-group. Given any two potentials 1 and 2, we say 
1 = 2 if 1 and 2 have the same domains and the same 
 
values for each state of the domain. Since the 
combination operator involves normalization, two 
potentials 1 and 2 with the same domain, say f, and 
whose values differ by a positive constant k, i.e., 2(y) = 
k 1(y) for all y  f, have essentially the same 
information since 1  = 2  for all potentials   . 
In this case, we say that 1 and 2 are equivalent, and 
denote this by 1  2. Notice that  is an equivalence 
relation, and we use the normal potential in this 
equivalence class as a representative. 
Let f denote the set of normal potentials with domain f. 
Let f denote the potential for f that is identically zero, 
i.e., f(y) = 0 for all y  f. We refer to f as the zero 
potential for f. Then ( f { f}, ) is a semi-group. This 
semi-group has a unique identity element f which is the 
potential for f such that f(y) = k for all y  f where k = 
1/| f|. f has the property that f  =  for every 
  f { f}. In particular, f f = f, i.e., f is 
idempotent. We call f, and the potentials in its 
equivalence class, vacuous potentials for f. 
Observation Potentials. Consider the semi-group 
( f { f}, ). Let a  f. Consider the potential a for f 
defined as follows: a(a) = 1, and a(y) = 0 for all 
y  f, y  a. Clearly a  f. a has the property that 
a  = a for all   f such that  is combinable with 
a, and a  = f for all   f such that  is not 
combinable with a. In particular, a a = a, i.e., a is 
idempotent. We call such potentials observation 
potentials. 
Division. Suppose f  g, suppose  is a potential for g, 
and suppose  is a positive potential for f. Then we 
define , read as  divided by , as a potential for g 
defined by 
( )(x) = (x)/ (x f) for all x g. (2.4) 
If  is a positive potential for f, then  is a vacuous 
potential for f. If  is a potential for g, then ( )  = 
( ) = f where f is the normal vacuous potential 
for f. 
Conditionals. In probability theory, we often build large 
probability models using conditioning. Conditioning is 
important since it allows us to factor a joint distribution 
into several potentials. Suppose f and g are disjoint 
subsets of variables, and suppose  is a potential for f g 
such that g is a vacuous potential for f. Then  is said to 
be a conditional for g given f. 
A rationale for this definition is as follows. Suppose  is 
a normal positive potential for f. Then consider the 
probability distribution P =  for f g where  is a 
conditional for g given f. Then P f = ( ) f = ( )–g = 
g =  (since g is vacuous for f). Thus  represents 
the marginal distribution of f. Now consider the 
conditional distribution of g given f. Suppose x  g and 
y  f. Then P(x | y) = P(x, y)/P(y) = ( )(x, y)/ (y) = 
(K 1 (y) (x, y))/ (y) = K 1 (x, y). Thus, the values of  
can be regarded as conditional probabilities (up to a 
normalization constant). 
3 CI as Irrelevance 
Suppose we are constructing a probability model for a 
collection of three variables as follows. A flight departs 
from Los Angeles, stops in Denver and arrives in Kansas 
City. Let D1 denote departure from LA with states ‘oLA’ 
(for on-time departure from LA) and ‘lLA,’ (for late 
departure from LA), let D2 denote departure of the same 
flight from Denver with the similar two states, oD and lD, 
and let A denote arrival in Kansas City with two states, 
oKC and lKC. 
One method of constructing the joint distribution for D1, 
D2, and A is to assess the prior distribution of D1 denoted 
by, say 1, the conditional distribution of D2 given D1, 
denoted by 2, and the conditional distribution of A given 
D1 and D2, denoted by . Thus, 1(x) = P(x) for all x  
D1
, 2(x, y) = P(y | x) for all x  D1, and y  D2, and 
(x, y, z) = P(z | x, y) for all x  D1, y  D2, and 
z  A. Probability theory tells us that we can construct 
the joint distribution for D1, D2, and A, denoted by , by 
combining these three potentials, i.e., 
 = 1 2 ,  (3.1) 
i.e., (x, y, z) = P(x) P(y | x) P(z | x, y) for x  D1, 
y  D2, and z  A. In this model, it is reasonable to 
assume that once we know the value of D2, further 
knowledge of D1 is irrelevant to A. Thus, given a value 
of D2 (departure from Denver), D1 (departure from LA) 
is irrelevant for assessing the distribution of A (arrival in 
Kansas City), i.e.,  
P(A = lKC | D1 = lLA, D2 = lD)  
= P(A = lKC | D1 = oLA, D2 = lD), and  
P(A = lKC | D1 = lLA, D2 = oD) 
= P(A = lKC | D1 = oLA, D2 = oD).  (3.2) 
A formal way of saying this is A is conditionally 
independent of D1 given D2, or using symbols, 
A  D1 | D2. Thus, we define conditional independence 
 
as a tri-nary relation between disjoint subsets of variables 
as follows. 
Suppose P is a joint probability distribution for variables 
in X, and suppose X1, X2, and X3 are three mutually 
disjoint subsets of X. We say X1 is conditionally 
independent of X2 given X3 with respect to P, written as 
X1  X2 | X3, if and only if  
P(x1 | x2, x3) = P(x1 | x3) (3.3) 
for all states x1, x2, and x3 of X1, X2, and X3, 
respectively, such that P(x2, x3) > 0. If X3 = , then we 
say X1 and X2 are marginally independent. 
4 CI as Factorization 
Consider the example discussed earlier about departures 
and arrival, in which A  D1 | D2. We shall show that this 
means the joint distribution for D1, D2, and A factorizes 
into two potentials whose domains are {A, D2} and 
{D1, D2}. It is easy to see that if (3.2) holds, then 
P(A = lKC | D1 = lLA, D2 = lD) 
= P(A = lKC | D1 = oLA, D2 = lD)  
= P(A = lKC | D2 = lD), 
and  
P(A = lKC | D1 = lLA, D2 = oD) 
= P(A = lKC | D1 = oLA, D2 = oD) 
= P(A = lKC | D2 = oD). 
This means that we can replace P(A | D1, D2) in (1) by 
P(A | D2). Thus the joint distribution for D1, D2, and A 
factorizes into two potentials, a potential 
P(D1) P(D2 | D1) whose domain is {D1, D2}, and a 
potential P(A | D2) whose domain is {A, D2}. 
The converse is also true, i.e., if we assume that the joint 
distribution  factorizes into two factors,  with domain 
{D1, D2}, and  with domain {D2, A}, then A  D1 | D2. 
Let a, d1, d2 denote any states of A, D1, and D2, 
respectively. Then  
P(a | d1, d2) = P(a, d1, d2) / P(d1, d2)  
 = ( (d1, d2) (d2, a)) / ( (d1, d2) 
D2(d2)) 
 = (d2, a) / 
D2(d2). 
Also P(a | d2) = P(a, d2) / P(d2)  
 = ( D2(d2) (d2, a)) / (
D2(d2) 
D2(d2))  
 = (d2, a) / 
D2(d2). 
Therefore, it follows that P(a | d1, d2) = P(a | d2), 
proving our claim. 
5 CI as No Double Counting 
In the previous cases, we used the language of 
independence of subset of variables with respect to a 
joint probability distribution. Here we will shift our 
language and talk about independence of knowledge with 
respect to a joint probability distribution. By knowledge, 
we mean probability potentials. In this section, we 
provide a formal definition of independence of 
potentials, which is motivated by the notion of no double 
counting of uncertain knowledge. 
In constructing a joint probability distribution for several 
variables, we break our knowledge into smaller pieces 
and then combine these pieces to get the joint 
distribution. In the process of combining various pieces 
of knowledge, we need to ensure that we are not double-
counting some uncertain knowledge. To take a small 
example, suppose our prior distribution of D1 is vacuous, 
and based on some evidence we get likelihoods as 
follows: 1(lLA) = 0.1, 1(oLA) = 0.9. If we include this 
piece of information twice, e.g., we get the potential 
1 1 which has values ( 1 1)(lLA)  0.01, 
( 1 1)(oLA)  0.99. Thus, 1 1  1. Double counting 
of uncertain knowledge overestimates more probable 
states and underestimates low probable states. In 
uncertain reasoning, one must be cautious not to double-
count uncertain information. 
There are exceptions, of course. Some probability 
potentials are idempotent. Examples are deterministic (or 
categorical) knowledge. If we observe that D1 = lLA and 
express this knowledge by the likelihood potential (lLA) 
= 1, (oLA) = 0, then  = . In propositional logic, all 
knowledge is expressed without uncertainty and double 
counting is not an issue. 
There is another case of idempotent knowledge. Suppose 
based on some evidence for D1, we get equally likely 
likelihoods, i.e., 1(lLA) = 1(oLA) = 1/2. This is a 
vacuous potential for D1 and it is also idempotent, and 
double counting of such knowledge is not a problem. 
Definition. We formally define independence of 
potentials as follows. Suppose  is a potential for f, 
and  is a potential for g, and  is a normal potential 
for f g. We say  and  are independent with respect 
to  if and only if 
  =   (5.1) 
Next, we shall state several interesting sufficient 
conditions for independence of potentials. 
Trivial Independence I (Vacuous Likelihoods). 
Suppose  is a normal potential for g, and suppose  is a 
 
vacuous potential for f, where f  g. Since  is vacuous, 
 = . Thus there is no harm in multiplying a normal 
potential with a vacuous potential. We shall state this as 
our first lemma. 
Lemma 1. Suppose  is a normal potential for g, and 
suppose  is a vacuous potential for f, where f  g. 
Then  and  are independent with respect to . 
Trivial Independence II (Observations). There is 
another case of trivial independence. Suppose we have a 
joint distribution  of some set of variables g. Now 
suppose we observe the values a  f of variables in f, 
where f  g, and f(a) > 0, and this is represented by 
observation potential a. The posterior distribution of 
variables in g is a. Suppose 
f is a positive potential 
for f. Since a is an observation potential, there is no 
effect by double counting information about f since a 
= f ( f) a = (
f) a. 
Lemma 2. Suppose  is a normal potential for g, and 
suppose a is an observation potential for f where 
f  g, and f(a) > 0. Then  and a are independent 
with respect to a. 
Conditioning. Suppose we wish to construct a joint 
distribution  of two variables, say D1 and D2. 
Probability theory tells us that one way to do this is to 
factor  into two pieces, 1 with domain D1 (representing 
the prior distribution of D1), and 2 with domain {D1, 
D2}, such that 2 is a conditional for D2 given D1, i.e., 
2
–D2 is vacuous. 1 contains some information about D1, 
and 2 contains information of how D2 is related to D1. 
Potentially, there could be double counting of 
information about D1. But since 2 is a conditional for 
D2 given D1, 2 tells us nothing about D1. So there is no 
double counting in combining 1 and 2. We state this as 
our third lemma. 
Lemma 3. Suppose f and g are disjoint subsets of 
variables, and suppose  is a normal potential for f g 
such that f is positive. Then f and f are 
independent with respect to . 
Marginal Independence. Next, consider the following 
case of marginal independence in probability theory. 
Suppose f and g are disjoint subsets of variables that are 
independent with respect to the joint distribution  with 
domain f g. This means that (x, y) = f(x) g(y) for 
all x  f, and y  g. Thus, we can state our fourth 
lemma as follows. 
Lemma 4. Suppose f and g are disjoint subsets of 
variables that are marginally independent with respect 
to the joint distribution  for f g. Then the potentials 
f with domain f and g with domain g are 
independent with respect to . 
The condition that f and g are marginally independent 
with respect to the joint distribution  is crucial in the 
above lemma. Suppose this condition is not true. Assume 
f is positive. Then we can decompose  into  = 
f 
with domain f and  = f with domain f g. This 
means  = , and g = ( ) g. Thus f and g are 
not independent since f is being counted twice—it also 
appears in g. If indeed f and g are marginally 
independent, then  = f = ( f g) f = g f, 
where f is a vacuous valuation for f, and thus there is no 
double counting of f. By a similar reasoning, we can 
establish that f and g are not independent since g is 
being double counted (in the same sense as f). 
In the above analysis, double counting of f does not 
literally mean that in combining f and g, we are 
multiplying f twice. Instead, f g = f ( f ) g. 
Thus even if f were idempotent by virtue of being 
equally likely, we would still not have independence 
between f and g. Even if we had a probability model 
in which f and g were both vacuous, we still 
wouldn’t have independence of f and g with respect 
to . A simple numerical example is shown in Table 1. 
Consider the following case. Initially, we express our 
knowledge about variables in f g using potentials f 
with domain f and potential  with domain f g such that 
f  = . Suppose that f and g are not independent with 
respect to . Therefore, f and ( f ) g are not 
independent with respect to . Now we get an additional 
piece of knowledge, say an observation a of the variables 
in f. Let us denote this knowledge by observation 
potential a with domain f. Since a represents an 
observation, a(a) = 1 for a  f, and a(y) = 0 for all y 
 f, y  a. Including this knowledge, the joint 
knowledge is a
f  = ´, say. What can we say 
about independence of variables with respect to the 
revised distribution ´? First, notice that a
f = a. 
Second, ´ f = a since  is a conditional for g given f. 
Third, ´ g = ( a )
g. Fourth, ´ f ´ g = a ( a )
g 
= ´ since ´(a, y) = a(a) (a, y) = (a, y), and 
( a ( a )
g)(a, y) = a(a) ( a )
g(y) = ( a )
g(y) = 
a(a) (a, y) + { a(x) (x, y) | x  a} = (a, y), and for x 
 a, ´(x, y) = ( a ( a )
g)(x, y) = 0. Therefore, f and 
 
g are independent with respect to ´. And consequently, 
a and ( a )
g are independent with respect to a . 
 
  A    
   b1 1  
 a1      
   b2 0 0 
       
    b1 0 0 
 a2       
   b2 1  
      
 A   B  
a1   b1   
a2   b2   
      
  A B A B   
a1, b1      
a1, b2    0  
a2, b1    0  
a2, b2      
Table 1. A probability model for two variables in which 
A and B are vacuous and yet A and B are not 
independent. 
Conditional Independence. Next, we discuss 
conditional independence. Suppose f, g, and h are 
mutually disjoint subsets of variables such that f and g 
are conditionally independent given h with respect to . 
This means that  = h f g, where g has domain 
g h. If h is positive, then we can write g = 
g h h, i.e., g is the conditional for g given h. We 
can now state our next lemma. 
Lemma 5. Suppose f, g, and h are mutually disjoint 
subsets of variables such that f and g are conditionally 
independent given h with respect to , and suppose 
h is strictly positive. Then f h, and g h h are 
independent with respect to . 
Notice that under the assumptions of Lemma 5, f h and 
g h may not be independent with respect to  since h 
is double-counted. However, if h is idempotent, then 
f h and g h are in fact independent with respect to . 
This is true even if h is not strictly positive. Finally, 
suppose f and g are conditionally independent given h 
with respect to , and suppose we observe the values of 
variables in h. Let a denote the observation likelihood 
potential. Then ( a)
f and ( a)
g are independent 
with respect to ( a)
(f g). 
6 Independence of Potentials and 
Graphoid Properties 
In this section, we show that the definition of 
independence of potentials stated in (5.1) satisfies the 
graphoid properties of conditional independence (Dawid 
[1979], Spohn [1980], Pearl and Paz [1987]). 
Proposition 1 (Symmetry). If  and  are independent 
with respect to , then  and  are independent with 
respect to . 
The symmetry property follows trivially from the 
commutative property of combination. Next, we examine 
the decomposition property. 
Proposition 2 (Decomposition). Suppose  is a 
potential for f, and  is a potential for g such that  and 
 are independent with respect to . Suppose X  g, 
and X  f. Then  and X are independent with 
respect to –X. 
The decomposition property follows from the transitivity 
of marginalization over combination, a key property that 
is essential for local computation. Next, we examine the 
property called weak union. 
Proposition 3 (Weak Union). Suppose  is a potential 
for f, and  is a potential for g such that  and  are 
independent with respect to . Suppose X  g, and 
X  f, and suppose we observe value a of X. Then  
and ( a)
X are independent with respect to 
( a)
X. 
Proof. Since  and  are independent with respect to , it 
follows from Lemma 2 that  and a are independent 
with respect to a. From proposition 2, it follows that 
 and ( a)
X are independent with respect to 
( a)
X.  
Next, we look at the contraction property. 
Proposition 4 (Contraction). Suppose f, g, and h are 
disjoint sets of variables such that h f, and 
h g h are independent with respect to . Also 
suppose that h and f are independent with respect 
to h f. Then f and h g are independent with 
respect to . 
Proof. It follows from the first hypothesis that 
h f ( h g h) = . It follows from the second 
hypothesis that h f = h f. Substituting the second 
equality in the first, we get ( h f) ( h g h) = , 
i.e., f h g = , thus proving the proposition.  
 
Finally we examine the intersection property. 
Proposition 5 (Intersection). Suppose  is a positive 
normal potential for f g h where f, g, and h are 
disjoint sets of variables. Suppose that h f, and 
h g h are independent with respect to , and 
suppose that g f, and h g g are independent 
with respect to . Then f and g h are independent 
with respect to . 
Proof. Since  = h f ( h g h), it follows that 
h g = ( h f h) h g = (
h f h) g. Also, 
since  = g f ( h g g), it follows that h g = 
( g f g) h. Since the LHS of the last two 
expressions are equal, their RHS must be equal, i.e., 
( h f h) g = (
g f g) h. Multiplying both 
sides by h g, we get ( h f h) g
h g = 
( g f g) h
h g, i.e., h f g = g f h. 
Marginalizing h from both sides of the equality, we get 
f g = g f, i.e., f and g are independent with 
respect to g f, and marginalizing g from both sides of 
the equality, we get h f = f h, i.e., f and h are 
independent with respect to h f. Substituting this last 
assertion in the first assumption of the proposition, we 
get  = h f ( h g h) = h f ( h g h) = 
f h g, i.e., f and g h are independent with 
respect to .  
7 Two Examples 
In this section, we describe two examples to illustrate the 
definition and results in the previous sections. 
Example 1. Consider a graphical probability model for 
three variables, H (hypothesis), E1 (evidence 1), and E2 
(evidence 2), as shown in Figure 1. According to this 
graphical model, E1  E2 | H. 
Assume all three variables are binary with states h and nh 
for H, e1 and ne1 for E1, and e2 and ne2 for E2. Let  
denote the prior distribution for H, 1 the conditional 
distributions for E1 given H, and 2 the conditional 
distributions for E2 given H. By Lemmas 3 and 5, , 1, 
and 2 are independent (with respect to , the prior joint 
distribution of H, E1, and E2). Thus, the prior joint 
distribution of H, E1, and E2 is given by  = 1 2. 
Suppose we have two pieces of evidence: we observe 
states e1 of E1, and e2 of E2, such that 
E1(e1) > 0 and 
E2(e2) > 0. We can represent these pieces of evidence 
by observation potentials e1 and e2. By Lemma 2, the 
posterior joint distribution of H, E1, and E2 is given by 
1 2 e1 e2
. The marginal posterior distribution 
of H is given by ( 1 2 e1 e2)
–{E1, E2} = 
( 1 e1)
–E1 ( 2 e2)
–E2 (using Proposition 3). Thus 
we conclude that , ( 1 e1)
–E1, and ( 2 e2)
–E2 are 
independent potentials for H and combining these gives 
the correct posterior marginal distribution for H based on 





















































where K1, K2, K3 are normalization constants that do not 
depend on the states of H. Notice that independence of 
evidence potentials ( 1 e1)
–E1 and ( 2 e2)
–E2 follows 
from the Markov assumption of the graphical model that 
E1  E2 | H.  
 
Figure 1. A graphical model for H, E1, and E2. 
Example 2. Consider a graphical probability model for 
three variables, H1 (hypothesis 1), H2 (hypothesis 2), and 
E (evidence), as shown in Figure 2. According to this 
graphical model, H1  H2. 
Assume all three variables are binary with states h1 and 
nh1 for H1, h2 and nh2 for H2, and e and ne for E. Let 1 
denote the prior distribution for H1, 2 the prior 
distribution for H2, and  the conditional distribution for 
E given H1 and H2. By Lemmas 4 and 3, the potentials 
1, 2, and  are independent (with respect to , the prior 
joint distribution of H1, H2, and E). Thus, the prior joint 
distribution of H1, H2, and E is given by  = 1 2 . 
 
 
Figure 2. A graphical model for H1, H2, and E. 
Suppose we have one piece of evidence: we observe state 
e of E such that E(e) > 0. We can represent this piece 
of evidence by observation potential e for E. By Lemma 
2, the posterior joint distribution of {H1, H2, E} is given 
by 1 2 e. The posterior marginal distribution of 
H1, H2 is given by ( 1 2 e)
E = 
( 1 2 ( e)
E (using Proposition 3). Thus we 
conclude that 1, 2, and ( 2)
E are independent 
potentials (for H1, H2, and {H1, H2}, respectively) and 
combining these gives the correct posterior distribution 















































































































where K1 and K2 are normalization constants that do not 
depend on the states of {H1, H2}. Notice that although 
H1 and H2 are marginally independent, they are not 
independent after the evidence if the evidence is not 
vacuous.  
8 Summary and Conclusions 
We have defined conditional independence in terms of 
no double counting of uncertain knowledge. We state 
five sufficient conditions for independence of potentials, 
and we have showed that our definition of independence 
of potentials satisfies the graphoid properties of 
conditional independence. 
Although we have stated all results so far for probability 
theory, the results generalize easily to any uncertainty 
calculi that fit in the framework of valuation-based 
systems. Shenoy [1994] shows that probability theory, 
Dempster-Shafer’s belief function theory, Spohn’s 
[1988] theory of epistemic beliefs, and Zadeh’s [1979] 
possibility theory (with combination defined as pointwise 
multiplication followed by normalization when 
normalization is possible) are some examples of 
uncertainty calculi that are captured by the axiomatic 
framework of valuation-based systems. Smets’s [1998] 
transferable belief model, and Kohlas-Monney’s [1995] 
theory of hints are mathematically the same as D-S 
theory, and consequently, the results stated here apply to 
these theories as well. Qualitative possibility theory, in 
which the combination rule is pointwise minimization 
does not fit the axiomatic framework of valuation-based 
system, and consequently, the results stated here do not 
apply to it. 
The results stated here also apply to the D-S belief 
function theory. In this theory, Dempster’s rule of 
combination is only supposed to be used for 
“independent” belief functions. Using the results in this 
paper, and the framework of valuation-based systems 
[Shenoy 1994], it is easy to see that independence of 
belief functions is mathematically equivalent to the 
conditional independence theory for variables in 
probability theory. 
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